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Date: Sun, 31 Jul 2022 17:24:05 +0000 (UTC)
From: INSO_AFG_DD <deputydirector@afg.ngosafety.org>
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Message-ID: <aSvR6-N3QmKUqR71acy7lw@geopod-ismtpd-3-1>
Subject: The Risk of IS-KP Attacks Towards NGOs Remain Following Recent IS-KP
 Publication
To: Ahmadullah Shinwari <dr.shinwari@jack.ngo>

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nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;ATTENTION RECOMMENDED</span></div>
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								<div style=3D"margin: 12.5px 25px; padding: 0 12.5px 0 0;">LOCATION=
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								<div style=3D"text-align: justify;">Afghanistan, Countrywide&nbsp;<=
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								<div style=3D"margin: 12.5px 25px; padding: 0 12.5px 0 0;">INCIDENT=
 TYPE</div>
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2.0pt; font-family: 'Arial', sans-serif; line-height:115%;  ">
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ttom:1px solid #C1C2C4;">
								IS-KP Publication on Foreign Aid to Afghanistan and IEA Foreign Pol=
icy								</div>
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lor:#15274B;  ">
								<div style=3D"margin: 12.5px 25px; padding: 0 12.5px 0 0;">DATE & T=
IME</div>
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2.0pt; font-family: 'Arial', sans-serif; line-height:115%;  ">
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ttom:1px solid #C1C2C4;">
								26/07/2022 18:00								</div>
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								<div style=3D"margin: 12.5px 25px; padding: 0 12.5px 0 0;">INFORMAT=
ION</div>
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2.0pt; font-family: 'Arial', sans-serif; line-height:115%;  ">
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ttom:1px solid #C1C2C4;">
								<div style=3D"text-align: justify;">On 26 July, IS-KP issued a 121-=
page publication through its affiliated media channels. The publication cov=
ered the group's stance on international aid to Afghanistan and IEAs policy=
 towards specific foreign countries. The publication was written in Pashto,=
 with headlines and verses of the Quran in Arabic. The extensive publicatio=
n consolidates narratives about foreign aid to Afghanistan the group propag=
ated sporadically in the past, criticising both the IEA for accepting aid, =
the countries providing the aid, and the organisations delivering the aid t=
o Afghanistan.<br /><br /></div>
<div style=3D"text-align: justify;">While NGOs and IOs delivering assistanc=
e in Afghanistan are singled out in the publication and labelled as enemies=
, the publication has a much broader aim. The narratives presented in the p=
ublication focus on undermining the IEAs religious credibility for implemen=
ting a foreign policy considered accommodating to and receiving aid from co=
untries seen by IS-KP as non-Muslim and/or as committing wrongdoings toward=
s Muslims in general and IS members specifically. There is an apparent focu=
s on China, whose officials are also symbolically depicted on the cover pag=
e. However, multiple countries are specifically mentioned, including Iran, =
Pakistan, Turkey, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, =
Kazakhstan, Egypt, Libya and Yemen.<br /><br /></div>
<div style=3D"text-align: justify;">NGOs and IOs from countries defined as =
non-Muslim by IS-KP are labelled as enemies in the publication and accused =
of serving their own interests and political aims. According to the publica=
tion, they should be considered legitimate targets. While the publication h=
ighlights some select circumstances in which it is acceptable to talk to no=
n-Muslims, all organisations that are seen as promoting the concept of huma=
n rights are excluded from this category. Three IOs and one western donor a=
re specifically mentioned by name, while in general, all NGOs and IOs are s=
een as attempting to spread democracy, eradicate religion, spy, and/or work=
 for the political interests of their country of origin.<br /><br /></div>
<div style=3D"text-align: justify;">Finally, similar to previous IS-KP publ=
ications, vaccination campaigns are again highlighted as a weapon used by f=
oreign powers against Muslims. IS-KP claims that vaccines lead to several i=
llnesses, both in the recipient and subsequent generations.</div>								</=
div>
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								<div style=3D"margin: 12.5px 25px; padding: 0 12.5px 0 0;">ANALYSIS=
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ttom:1px solid #C1C2C4;">
								<div style=3D"text-align: justify;">IS-KP affiliates have previousl=
y demonstrated their intent and capability to attack NGOs in Afghanistan. N=
otably, on 24 January 2018, IS-KP affiliates attacked an NGO compound in Ja=
lalabad City's PD 2. The attackers breached the gate of the compound in a v=
ehicle rigged as a VBIED, before detonating the device inside the compound.=
 Following the explosion, five attackers entered the compound where they to=
ok positions on the upper floor and engaged first responders from the secur=
ity forces with SAF and grenades. As a result of the attack, which lasted f=
or 10 hours, 13 people were killed, including four NGO staff members, and 3=
1 people were injured, including at least nine NGO staff members. The willi=
ngness of IS-KP affiliates to target NGOs has most likely not changed, desp=
ite no such attacks recorded since the IEA takeover.<br /><br /></div>
<div style=3D"text-align: justify;">The absence of IS-KP claimed attacks ta=
rgeting NGOs in Afghanistan since August 2021 indicates a prioritisation of=
 resources, rather than a shift in targets assessed as legitimate by the gr=
oup or a decrease in capability, which remains subject to change. Since the=
 IEA takeover in August 2021, at least 176 attacks in Afghanistan were clai=
med or attributable to IS-KP. The attacks recorded since August 2021 follow=
ed a similar target profile as before the IEA takeover, with 73% targeting =
security forces, 17% targeting civilian members of religious or ethnic mino=
rities, and the remainder targeting unknown actors or foreigners. The lack =
of IS-KP-authored attacks on NGOs has most likely resulted from the priorit=
y given to IEA security forces and religious minorities to undermine the ab=
ility of IEA forces to provide security and demonstrate presence and streng=
th and an ability to obtain these objectives with less effort by targeting =
these groups.<br /><br /></div>
<div style=3D"text-align: justify;">NGOs remain an attractive target for IS=
-KP, and attacks on NGOs serve the same purpose of undermining public perce=
ptions and support of IEA security forces while showing the group's own str=
ength and presence. Historically, attacks on NGOs and IOs have furthermore =
received extensive media coverage, as seen in previous attacks in Afghanist=
an and elsewhere where IS affiliates are active. As such, attacks on NGOs w=
ould reach a broad audience and strengthen the narrative that the IEA are u=
nable to provide security, not only for its citizens but also for organisat=
ions operating in the country. Such attacks also further feed into the perc=
eption that IS-KP can strike its declared enemies throughout the country. M=
oreover, attacking NGOs would support the group's self-perception of being =
uncompromising in their opposition to external influences and their interpr=
etation of Jihad, in contrast to the IEA.<br /><br /></div>
<div style=3D"text-align: justify;">IS-KP has likely refrained from targeti=
ng NGOs in attacks since August 2021 partly because IEA targets and religio=
us minorities have been more accessible and required fewer resources, while=
 achieving the same strategic objective. IEDs have remained the preferred t=
actic for IS-KP, accounting for 52% of the IS-KP-authored attacks since 15 =
August 2021. The most frequently used form of IEDs were static IEDs, primar=
ily RCIEDs, followed by MIEDs. These IED attacks mostly targeted IEA forces=
 and, to a lesser degree, members of religious and ethnic minorities in tra=
nsit. Such tactics generally require limited effort, and IEA vehicles pose =
an attractive target, being highly prevalent across the country, easily ide=
ntifiable, and relatively unprotected from such attacks. SAF and RPG attack=
s accounted for a further 40% of IS-KP authored attacks, again targeting IE=
A forces predominantly. As with the IED-based attacks, IEA forces patrollin=
g or posted at checkpoints present easily accessible, stationary targets to=
 IS-KP members and can be attacked from a distance with limited risk. Final=
ly, IS-KP affiliates conducted seven BBIED attacks since 15 August 2021. In=
 at least three incidents, such attacks targeted places of worship of relig=
ious minorities, mostly Shia. In three other BBIED attacks, IS-KP targeted =
government facilities, while in one incident, the group attacked IMF forces=
 involved in the evacuation at the Kabul Airport. While such BBIED attacks =
in multiple cases caused high casualty figures and gained considerable medi=
a attention, the targets were in all cases relatively unprotected, and the =
attacks required limited capabilities. In comparison, standard access contr=
ol measures in place at most NGO premises would make NGOs a less accessible=
 target for such attacks.<br /><br /></div>
<div style=3D"text-align: justify;">While IEA forces are arguably more acce=
ssible for IED attacks, as outlined above, NGOs and IOs could present an at=
tractive target for similar attacks. Since August 2021, multiple IOs and NG=
Os have scaled up operations to address increasing humanitarian needs, expa=
nding into new areas that historically has had a low humanitarian presence =
and increasing their road movement across the country. This makes IOs and N=
GOs more exposed across the country, including in areas where the perceptio=
ns of the general population and local actors towards them is still relativ=
ely unclear. On 09 May, a roadside RCIED detonated against an IEA vehicle e=
scorting a joint IO and NGO convoy in Kunar's Dara-e Pech District, woundin=
g five IEA members. No group claimed responsibility for the attack, possibl=
y in part due to its limited impact, which may have led the author to deem =
the attack unsuccessful. However, IS-KP previously exerted influence in the=
 area, which most likely still houses cells and individuals supportive of I=
S-KP. While initial assessments pointed towards the IEA escort being the ta=
rget, the IO and NGO profile of the convoy as well as the delay in triggeri=
ng the device, indicates that this was not necessarily the case.<br /><br /=
></div>
<div style=3D"text-align: justify;">Aside from the above, IS-KP authored tw=
o complex attacks since August 2021, a modus operandi potentially more impa=
ctful to NGOs, both in term of collateral risk and should IS-KP affiliates =
target NGOs directly. Both attacks wre conducted in Kabul City and applied =
similar tactics. Notably, on 02 November 2021, a person riding a motorcycle=
 detonated a BBIED at the entrance gate to the Sardar Dawood Khan Military =
Hospital in Kabul City. Multiple armed individuals then entered the hospita=
l grounds, firing SAF at civilians and IEA members. At least 21 individuals=
, including three assailants, were killed and 52 others wounded in the atta=
ck, including IEA members, medical staff, and civilians. IS-KP claimed resp=
onsibility for the attack. The second attack, also claimed by IS-KP, took p=
lace on 18 June, when five individuals attacked a Sikh temple during a cere=
mony. One of the assailants detonated a BBIED at the entrance gate of the c=
ompound, before the remaining four assailants entered the temple, detonated=
 a second BBIED inside, and fired SAF at worshippers. The attack killed nin=
e and wounded 15.<br /><br /></div>
<div style=3D"text-align: justify;">Additionally, IDF is likely to remain a=
 preferred tactic to attack larger, more protected targets, including IOs a=
nd government installations. Since August 2021, at least six rocket attacks=
 attributable to IS-KP were recorded in different parts of the country. Not=
ably, on 01 July OAG members fired two rockets towards the Loya Jirga tent =
inside the Polytechnical University in Kabul City. One of the projectiles l=
anded inside the university campus, while the second projectile landed in a=
n adjacent secondary road. IS-KP claimed responsibility for the attack. IDF=
 using rockets and mortars have been a preferred tactic of OAGs, including =
IS-KP, to target government and military installations, particularly within=
 Kabul City before the IEA takeover in August 2021. Despite their mostly lo=
w impact, such attacks often receive relatively high media coverage, achiev=
ing a key objective of IS-KP. While the risk to NGOs is mostly collateral, =
larger IO premises most likely would represent an attractive target for suc=
h attacks as well.<br /><br /></div>
<div style=3D"text-align: justify;">Increased intent to target NGOs as a re=
sult of the publication cannot be ruled out. Among other objectives, public=
ations such as the one issued on 26 July are most likely used to direct IS-=
KP sympathisers and autonomously operating groups and individuals in the ab=
sence of an established command-and-control structure. In May, attacks auth=
ored by the group in Afghanistan spiked as a global offensive had been decl=
ared, again most likely through media publications rather than direct order=
s guiding the attackers. However, the directives or intentions communicated=
 in these publications are subject to interpretation by the recipients, and=
 how they translate on the ground is difficult to accurately assess or pred=
ict. The narrative presented in the 26 July publication is not new, and whi=
le specifically mentioning IOs and NGOs as enemies, it could also be interp=
reted as focusing on blaming the IEA for receiving aid from countries IS-KP=
 considers hostile and potentially appealing to IEA members dissatisfied wi=
th the foreign policy of the IEA after the takeover.<br /><br /></div>
<div style=3D"text-align: justify;">Vaccinators were once again mentioned s=
pecifically as a target, highlighting consistent messaging from IS-KP to ta=
rget them. Vaccinators have been attacked in multiple incidents in various =
parts of Afghanistan in the past, and the scepsis and hostility towards vac=
cination programmes in some parts of the country date back much longer than=
 this messaging from IS-KP. Most likely, IS-KP are exploiting pre-existing =
biases to gain further support.<br /><br /></div>
<div style=3D"text-align: justify;">The main objective of IS-KP is likely t=
o remain the same in the near future: to undermine the IEA and portray an i=
mage of strength and uncompromised effort in their fight for what the group=
 considers to be a true Islamic system. IS-KP will likely attempt to presen=
t themselves as an alternative to a government which they see as having com=
promised on Islamic tenets, without having any intention in the short term =
to challenge control of any larger swaths of territory. To do this, IS-KP a=
re likely to continue to rely on autonomous groups and individuals aligned =
with their ideology, operating with no or only limited direct command and c=
ontrol. To obtain their objective, IS-KP affiliates are likely to continue =
to prioritise attacks on religious minorities, particularly Shia Muslims, a=
s well as IEA forces, through similar tactics outlined above. This will lik=
ely entail high-frequency low-scale SAF and IED attacks in and outside citi=
es, while focusing on high-impact attacks towards relatively unprotected ta=
rgets within the main cities, where such attacks will receive the most medi=
a attention. Furthermore, attempts at complex attacks on semi-protected loc=
ations cannot be ruled out. IS-KP operatives are likely to conduct surveill=
ance to select targets for such attacks in order to exploit key structural =
vulnerabilities. Where such structural vulnerabilities are easily identifie=
d, NGOs are also likely to be attractive targets of opportunity for similar=
 attacks.</div>								</div>
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								<div style=3D"margin: 12.5px 25px; padding: 0 12.5px 0 0;">ADVICE</=
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ttom:1px solid #C1C2C4;">
								<div style=3D"text-align: justify;">NGOs are advised to ensure that=
 existing physical security measures at all of their premises are properly =
maintained and fully functional. NGO security managers should carefully and=
 systematically inspect premises to assess the mitigation measures in place=
 to identify any need for maintenance and improvements.<br /><br /></div>
<div style=3D"text-align: justify;">NGOs are also advised to review securit=
y protocols and procedures, to ensure that these are still relevant and ful=
ly enforced. Emergency procedures should be tested through drills to ensure=
 that all staff know how to react in the event of an emergency. Special emp=
hasis should be put in ensuring that newly arrived staff are familiar with =
procedures and that more experienced staff have not become complacent. Non-=
emergency security procedures and protocols, such as access &nbsp;and movem=
ent control procedures should be checked to ensure that these are still rel=
evant and strictly implemented. Observed complacency should be addressed im=
mediately through briefings and other active interventions.<br /><br /></di=
v>
<div style=3D"text-align: justify;">NGOs should ensure that staff are famil=
iar with the concept of countersurveillance, that this is applied when leav=
ing and arriving at NGO premises as well as while in transit, and that ther=
e are procedures in place to report any suspicious behavior noticed. Furthe=
rmore, security managers should ensure that guards conduct frequent patroll=
ing, exercise countersurveillance while doing so and report anything suspic=
ious immediately.<br /><br /></div>
<div style=3D"text-align: justify;">Suspicious behaviour might include pers=
ons taking photos of the compound, appearing to communicate on the phone wh=
en staff are entering or leaving the compound, and persons asking for sensi=
tive information of staff members or neighbours. NGO drivers should inform =
guards in advance of entering and exiting the compound so that guards can c=
heck the outer perimeter for suspicious activity in advance.<br /><br /></d=
iv>
<div style=3D"text-align: justify;">Procedures on how to react in case of a=
n MIED being attached to the vehicle should be implemented and rehearsed to=
 ensure that all staff members are familiar with and able to apply the corr=
ect reaction. The preferable reaction includes evacuating the vehicle immed=
iately to a safe distance and requesting support from local authorities whi=
le acquiring alternative transportation to evacuate staff from the scene.<b=
r /><br /></div>
<div style=3D"text-align: justify;">Recurring patterns in movements should =
be avoided or at least minimised as far as possible. To avoid patterns in m=
ovement, multiple factors should be frequently varied, including but not li=
mited to; timings, routes, pick-up and drop-off points, vehicles used, driv=
ers, and working hours.</div>
<div style=3D"text-align: justify;">Time spend near attractive targets for =
OAG attacks should be mimised. As such, NGOs are advised to keep a distance=
 of six vehicle lengths to IEA vehicles when in transit and minimise time s=
pend at IEA checkpoints and other government installations.<br /><br /></di=
v>
<div style=3D"text-align: justify;">NGO staff members should avoid public g=
atherings unless deemed strictly necessary. NGO staff are reminded to alway=
s apply good situational awareness protocols when moving around or at locat=
ions with public access. Good situational awareness includes always conside=
ring ones surrounding to identify suspicious behaviour and plan for escape =
ways in case of urgent need. When monitoring one's surroundings for potenti=
ally suspicious behaviour, instincts should always be acted upon; if someth=
ing feels wrong, leave immediately. <br /><br />Finally, NGOs are reminded =
that the humanitarian principles of impartiality and independence are key t=
o ensuring that NGOs are not seen as part of conflict and should be applied=
 at all times. A perception of NGOs supporting the IEA, or any other party =
to the conflict, could support the narrative conveyed by IS-KP and increase=
 the risk towards NGOs.</div>								</div>
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lor:#15274B;  ">
								<div style=3D"margin: 12.5px 25px; padding: 0 12.5px 0 0;">ISSUED B=
Y</div>
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2.0pt; font-family: 'Arial', sans-serif; line-height:115%;  ">
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ttom:1px solid #C1C2C4;">
								<div style=3D"text-align: justify;">Deputy Director, Martin Hansen<=
br /><br /></div>
<div style=3D"text-align: justify;"><a href=3D"mailto:deputydirector@afg.ng=
osafety.org">deputydirector@afg.ngosafety.org</a></div>								</div>
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lor:#15274B;  ">
								<div style=3D"margin: 12.5px 25px; padding: 0 12.5px 0 0;">INSO SER=
IAL #</div>
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2.0pt; font-family: 'Arial', sans-serif; line-height:115%;  ">
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ttom:1px solid #C1C2C4;">
								AFGHANISTAN/COUNTRYWIDE/R/31072022/#001								</div>
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rial', sans-serif; color:white; text-align: center; vertical-align: middle;=
">
				INSO exists to provide dedicated security services to the NGO community=
. As a free service, INSO and its donors or partners, accept no liability w=
hatsoever for claims as may result from the provision or utilisation of the=
se free services. Whilst every effort is made to the verify data, INSO cann=
ot guarantee the accuracy of information provided. Reproduction of INSO inf=
ormation is prohibited.									<br>
<!-=
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=09
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