JezK

Edit File: 1632668453.M178336P1655694.mocha3025.mochahost.com,S=24660,W=25086:2,S

Envelope-to: faisal.ahmadzai@jack.ngo
Delivery-date: Sun, 26 Sep 2021 11:00:53 -0400
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Type: text/html; charset=us-ascii
Date: Sun, 26 Sep 2021 15:00:12 +0000 (UTC)
From: INSO_AFG_MOBILE2_SA <sa.mobile2@afg.ngosafety.org>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Message-ID: <f4vLyoGoTEq3dqun_4qMaA@geopod-ismtpd-4-1>
Subject: INSO REPORT - AFG - COUNTRYWIDE: Incidents of Targeting of Former
 ANSF and PGM Members Since 15 August
To: Faisal Ahmadzai <faisal.ahmadzai@jack.ngo>

<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC '-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN' 'http://www.w3.org=
/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd'><html><body><head><meta name=3D'viewport'=
 content=3D'initial-scale=3D1.0'><title>Alert Update</title></head><body><c=
enter><table width=3D"580" style=3D" width: 580px;  border:1px solid #C1C2C=
4; margin: 0 auto; background: #fff; text-align: center; border-collapse: c=
ollapse;" cellpadding=3D"0" cellspacing=3D"0">
=09
		<tr>
			<td style=3D"width: 100%; height: 27px; background-color: #5376b6; font-=
size: 7.5pt; font-family: 'Arial', sans-serif; color: white; vertical-align=
: middle; text-align: center;">
				This report is for the exclusive use of INSO partners and must not be s=
hared outside your organisation			</td>
		</tr>
		<tr>
			<td style=3D"text-align: left;">
				<table style=3D"width: 100%;" cellpadding=3D"0" cellspacing=3D"0">
				=09
						<tr>
							<td style=3D"width: 38%;">
								<img src=3D"https://partners.ngosafety.org/assets/img/report.png"/>
							</td>
							<td style=3D"width: 62%">
								<div>
									<div><span style=3D"font-size:24.0pt; font-weight: bold; margin: 0=
; padding: 0; font-family:'Arial', sans-serif; color:#5376b6">&nbsp;&nbsp;R=
EPORT</span></div>
									<div><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt; font-weight: bold; margin: 0=
; padding: 0; font-family:'Arial', sans-serif; color:#182748">&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;ATTENTION RECOMMENDED</span></div>
								</div>
							</td>
						</tr>
				=09
				</table>
			</td>
		</tr>
		<tr>
			<td style=3D"text-align: justify;">
				<table style=3D"width: 100%; border-top: 1px solid #C1C2C4;" cellpaddin=
g=3D"0" cellspacing=3D"0">
				=09
												<tr>
							<td width=3D"23%" valign=3D"top" style=3D"font-weight: bold; width:2=
3.52%; border:none; font-size: 12.0pt; font-family: 'Arial', sans-serif; co=
lor:#15274B;  ">
								<div style=3D"margin: 12.5px 25px; padding: 0 12.5px 0 0;">LOCATION=
</div>
							</td>
							<td width=3D"63%" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:63.58%; font-size: 1=
2.0pt; font-family: 'Arial', sans-serif; line-height:115%;  ">
								<div style=3D"margin: 12.5px 25px; padding: 0 0 12.5px 0; border-bo=
ttom:1px solid #C1C2C4;">
								Afghanistan, Countrywide								</div>
							</td>
						</tr>
												<tr>
							<td width=3D"23%" valign=3D"top" style=3D"font-weight: bold; width:2=
3.52%; border:none; font-size: 12.0pt; font-family: 'Arial', sans-serif; co=
lor:#15274B;  ">
								<div style=3D"margin: 12.5px 25px; padding: 0 12.5px 0 0;">INCIDENT=
 TYPE</div>
							</td>
							<td width=3D"63%" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:63.58%; font-size: 1=
2.0pt; font-family: 'Arial', sans-serif; line-height:115%;  ">
								<div style=3D"margin: 12.5px 25px; padding: 0 0 12.5px 0; border-bo=
ttom:1px solid #C1C2C4;">
								Incidents of Targeting of Former ANSF and PGM Members Since 15 Augu=
st								</div>
							</td>
						</tr>
												<tr>
							<td width=3D"23%" valign=3D"top" style=3D"font-weight: bold; width:2=
3.52%; border:none; font-size: 12.0pt; font-family: 'Arial', sans-serif; co=
lor:#15274B;  ">
								<div style=3D"margin: 12.5px 25px; padding: 0 12.5px 0 0;">DATE & T=
IME</div>
							</td>
							<td width=3D"63%" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:63.58%; font-size: 1=
2.0pt; font-family: 'Arial', sans-serif; line-height:115%;  ">
								<div style=3D"margin: 12.5px 25px; padding: 0 0 12.5px 0; border-bo=
ttom:1px solid #C1C2C4;">
								26/09/2021 19:00								</div>
							</td>
						</tr>
												<tr>
							<td width=3D"23%" valign=3D"top" style=3D"font-weight: bold; width:2=
3.52%; border:none; font-size: 12.0pt; font-family: 'Arial', sans-serif; co=
lor:#15274B;  ">
								<div style=3D"margin: 12.5px 25px; padding: 0 12.5px 0 0;">INFORMAT=
ION</div>
							</td>
							<td width=3D"63%" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:63.58%; font-size: 1=
2.0pt; font-family: 'Arial', sans-serif; line-height:115%;  ">
								<div style=3D"margin: 12.5px 25px; padding: 0 0 12.5px 0; border-bo=
ttom:1px solid #C1C2C4;">
								<div style=3D"text-align: justify;">On 15 August, the IEA&rsquo;s r=
apid ascend into power concluded with the collapse of the existing governme=
nt and security forces and the IEA takeover of Kabul. The IEA announced a g=
eneral amnesty on 17 August, during their first press conference following =
the takeover, including for those who had fought against the IEA. Since the=
n, incidents targeting former ANSF members and GOA affiliates have been obs=
erved across the country. These cases have led to repeated questioning of t=
he IEAs adherence to the amnesty by the media; however, in multiple cases, =
the motive and authorship behind such remained unconfirmed.<br /><br /></di=
v>
<div style=3D"text-align: justify;">On 21 September, the IEA reportedly ann=
ounced the formation of a commission across the three security agencies (Mo=
D, MOI and Intelligence) to oversee and clear the ranks of individuals invo=
lved in what the IEA communiqu&eacute; described as personal enmity, corrup=
tion, immoral behaviour, breach of human rights, harassment, theft, and oth=
er misdeeds and wrongdoings. The formation of the mentioned commission was =
followed by a statement by the acting Minister of Defense Mullah Mohammad Y=
aqoob, on 24 September, saying that there had been isolated reports of unau=
thorized executions, whereas under the general amnesty announced in Afghani=
stan no member of the IEA has the right to take revenge on anyone.<br /><br=
 /></div>
<div style=3D"text-align: justify;">At least 50 incidents have been recorde=
d targeting former members of the previous government's security forces and=
 pro-government militias across the country since 15 August. These incident=
s ranged from targeted killings (11), shootings (five), drive-by shootings =
(two), detentions under unknown circumstances (four), search operations by =
IEA forces (10) and arrests by IEA forces (10). At least 86 people were kil=
led, seven injured, and 105 were arrested or detained under unknown circums=
tances in these incidents. Aside from the above incidents, 713 former ANSF =
and PGM members were released on at least four recorded occasions in the sa=
me period, most of whom had been captured before or as part of the takeover=
.</div>								</div>
							</td>
						</tr>
												<tr>
							<td width=3D"23%" valign=3D"top" style=3D"font-weight: bold; width:2=
3.52%; border:none; font-size: 12.0pt; font-family: 'Arial', sans-serif; co=
lor:#15274B;  ">
								<div style=3D"margin: 12.5px 25px; padding: 0 12.5px 0 0;">ANALYSIS=
</div>
							</td>
							<td width=3D"63%" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:63.58%; font-size: 1=
2.0pt; font-family: 'Arial', sans-serif; line-height:115%;  ">
								<div style=3D"margin: 12.5px 25px; padding: 0 0 12.5px 0; border-bo=
ttom:1px solid #C1C2C4;">
								<div style=3D"text-align: justify;">Targeting of former ANSF, PGMs,=
 and other former government employees seems sporadic rather than systemati=
c so far. In some incidents, motive and IEA authorship are relatively strai=
ghtforward, while authorship and motive remain unconfirmed in others. In an=
y case, targeting of former ANSF and PGM members does not present a direct =
risk to NGO staff. However, relations to former ANSF and PGM members and fo=
rmer employees of GOA remains a risk vector, as multiple actors seek to set=
tle former disputes and IEA attempts to address any perceived potential for=
 organised armed opposition. Furthermore, accusations of relation to ANSF a=
nd possession of weapons can be used by the IEA to justify search operation=
s, despite other potential motives, providing a relatively free pass. House=
 searches have in some cases escalated into armed clashes causing a collate=
ral risk to anyone in the wrong place at the wrong time.<br /><br /></div>
<div style=3D"text-align: justify;">A number of killings occurred under unc=
lear circumstances. In at least four incidents (three in Kandahar and one i=
n Nimroz), former GOA security forces members were detained under unconfirm=
ed circumstances in their homes and later shot and killed. Furthermore, in =
four other incidents (one in Paktika, one in Helmand, one in Ghazni, and on=
e in Nimroz), dead bodies of former members of the security forces were fou=
nd by IEA forces. While anecdotal reporting indicates IEA involvement in so=
me of these incidents, INSO has not been able to independently ascertain au=
thorship.<br /><br /></div>
<div style=3D"text-align: justify;">In many cases, former security forces m=
embers were targeted in their homes. Since 15 August, a total of 30 inciden=
ts targeting former security forces members took place in their private res=
idences. These incidents included search operations conducted by IEA forces=
 (10), arrests or abductions either by IEA forces or unknown actors (12), t=
argeted killings by unknown actors (five), and shootings by unknown actors =
(two). As a result of these incidents targeting former members of the secur=
ity forces in their homes, 71 people were killed, 88 either arrested or abd=
ucted, and two injured.<br /><br /></div>
<div style=3D"text-align: justify;">A lower number of incidents targeted ot=
her former government officials in the same period. Since 15 August, 12 inc=
idents targeting former government officials were recorded countrywide. The=
se incidents included arrests and abductions (five), search operations cond=
ucted by IEA Forces (two), shootings (two), and a drive-by shooting (one). =
Furthermore, one release was registered. As a result of these incidents, th=
ree people were killed, two injured, and 13 were either arrested or abducte=
d.<br /><br /></div>
<div style=3D"text-align: justify;">The IEA's announcement of a general amn=
esty on 17 August followed a trend observed during the IEA offensive that l=
ed to the takeover, where IEA often pardoned and allowed ANSF members free =
passage if surrendering. This strategy served IEA well in the offensive, an=
d a continuation after taking control of the country, most likely, served t=
o prevent backlashes in support and project an image of a reconciliatory go=
vernment.<br /><br /></div>
<div style=3D"text-align: justify;">As the IEA continues to consolidate the=
 formal power, the central leadership most likely maintain an official poli=
cy of amnesty. This intent was shown by the release of 713 former members o=
f the GOA security forces since 15 August, many captured before the takeove=
r. Furthermore, the data currently available to INSO does not show a system=
atic targeting of the former government's security forces, at least in term=
s of killings, which seem more sporadic, very likely indicating more locali=
sed motives.<br /><br /></div>
<div style=3D"text-align: justify;">Targeted killings of members of the for=
mer government's security forces and cases of individuals detained under un=
known circumstances found killed, do represent a risk to these groups, and =
could stem from multiple actors. However, it represents little risk to NGO =
staff. While anecdotal reporting suggests IEA involvement in a number of th=
ese incidents, these were most likely the result of elements to some degree=
 acting autonomously rather than an authorised action reflecting the genera=
l IEA policy. Motives behind these incidents could be multiple, including p=
ersonal disputes or disputes directly related to the victim's former conduc=
t as an authority. Furthermore, in multiple cases, the perpetrators are ass=
essed to be criminal elements or individuals acting on similar motives.<br =
/><br /></div>
<div style=3D"text-align: justify;">While killings of former ANSF and PGM m=
embers do not represent an immediate risk to NGO staff, they indicate the d=
egree of autonomy enjoyed by local IEA groups and accepted by the central l=
eadership. The formation of an IEA commission to oversee and clear the rank=
s of individuals involved in personal enmity, corruption, immoral behaviour=
, breach of human rights, harassment, theft and other misdeeds and wrongdoi=
ngs was most likely an attempt to address a multitude of issues following t=
he takeover. This most likely included an acknowledgement of localised and =
autonomous revenge operations by local IEA groups or individuals, going aga=
inst the image the central leadership was trying to project. As such, this =
could, among other things, indicate both an acknowledgement of the problem =
and an attempt to address it.<br /><br /></div>
<div style=3D"text-align: justify;">House searches could potentially pose a=
 more immediate risk to NGO staff than the killings targeting former ANSF a=
nd PGM members. The vast majority of the 10 search operations conducted by =
IEA, targeting former security force members since 15 August, seem to have =
been related to disarmament efforts. Disarming former ANSF members is gener=
ally seen as a legitimate activity by the new de facto authorities. However=
, in some cases, the search operations did not result in the seizure of wea=
pons and in other cases, the searches were more likely targeting specific i=
ndividuals. Such incidents lead to doubt if search operations were necessar=
ily based on factual information of possession of weapons and whether alleg=
ations of storing weapons could serve as an excuse to target specific indiv=
iduals for a different reason.<br /><br /></div>
<div style=3D"text-align: justify;">An incident recorded in Kandahar could =
exemplify the use of disarmament as a pretext for harassment. On 11 Septemb=
er, IEA members entered the family house of a female activist and head of a=
 local welfare organisation supporting vulnerable families in Kandahar City=
 due to allegations that her two brothers, also living in the house, were f=
ormer NDS members and were storing weapons in the house. IEA members search=
ed the house and arrested the two brothers. No weapons were found in the ho=
use, and the two brothers were later released as allegations of former empl=
oyment with NDS were found to be incorrect. However, the motive could not b=
e independently verified, and IEA members acting upon deliberately incorrec=
t information from a third party regarding the brothers being former NDS an=
d storing weapons can also not be ruled out.&nbsp;<br /><br /></div>
<div style=3D"text-align: justify;">Aside from an increased likelihood of h=
ouse searches for former ANSF members and a risk that search for weapons is=
 used as an excuse to harass and target individuals, house searches have th=
e potential to evolve into armed clashes, presenting a collateral risk to c=
ivilians, including NGO staff finding themselves in the wrong place at the =
wrong time. In two separate incidents on 20 August, in Baghlan Province (on=
e in Deh Salah District and one in Pul-e Hasar District), IEA Forces entere=
d residences of former PGM members to collect weapons. In both incidents, P=
GM members engaged IEA members upon entry, resulting in armed clashes with =
high casualty numbers.<br /><br /></div>
<div style=3D"text-align: justify;">Former members of security forces are m=
ost likely to be targeted in their homes. Of the total incidents since 15 A=
ugust, 60% occurred in private residences. As such, the collateral risk for=
 NGOs and NGO staff is highest in residential areas, especially in areas wi=
th a high concentration of former government and security force employees. =
Furthermore, NGO staff members housing relatives or others with a backgroun=
d in the former government's security forces are more likely to experience =
search operations at their homes.<br /><br /></div>
<div style=3D"text-align: justify;">Despite a less systematic nature, forme=
r ANSF members and GOA employees have been targeted since the IEA takeover =
and will likely remain in IEA's focus, predominantly in an IEA attempt to p=
revent the emerging of organised armed opposition. As such, a collateral ri=
sk remains towards civilians, including NGO staff with relations to the for=
mer government and ANSF.</div>								</div>
							</td>
						</tr>
												<tr>
							<td width=3D"23%" valign=3D"top" style=3D"font-weight: bold; width:2=
3.52%; border:none; font-size: 12.0pt; font-family: 'Arial', sans-serif; co=
lor:#15274B;  ">
								<div style=3D"margin: 12.5px 25px; padding: 0 12.5px 0 0;">ADVICE</=
div>
							</td>
							<td width=3D"63%" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:63.58%; font-size: 1=
2.0pt; font-family: 'Arial', sans-serif; line-height:115%;  ">
								<div style=3D"margin: 12.5px 25px; padding: 0 0 12.5px 0; border-bo=
ttom:1px solid #C1C2C4;">
								<div style=3D"text-align: justify;">NGO staff is advised to be cogn=
izant that their potential relations to former ANSF and GOA members may rep=
resent a potential for house searches. NGO staff are advised to consider th=
at IEA is currently consolidating their rule of the country and looking to =
address any risk of an organized armed opposition towards them.<br /><br />=
</div>
<div style=3D"text-align: justify;">If staff experience a search of their h=
ome, it is recommended that effort is put in deescalating the situation. St=
aff are recommended to follow all instructions given by IEA members, within=
 reason, and openly answer questions. Staff should use clear, calm and non-=
confrontational verbal and body language.<br /><br /></div>
<div style=3D"text-align: justify;">Local IEA groups often have a limited u=
nderstanding of NGOs, their work, and humanitarian principles. To avoid any=
 misunderstandings and to deescalate the situation, NGO staff should be pre=
pared to explain the humanitarian principles, including neutrality, and the=
 NGOs compliance with a strict no-guns policy. Furthermore, staff should be=
 prepared to describe the particular work of the NGO. Depending on the natu=
re of the NGOs programming, emphasis should be placed on activities perceiv=
ed as less controversial while sticking to the truth.<br /><br /></div>
<div style=3D"text-align: justify;">NGO staff are furthermore advised to es=
tablish and maintain a relationship with relevant local IEA officials, incl=
uding local security/police commanders in the area of residency. Relevant c=
ontact information for these individuals should be kept available, and staf=
f should be prepared to call for assistance and deconfliction in the event =
of a house search. Furthermore, the organisation should maintain similar co=
ntacts to the relevant point of contact for NGOs and be prepared to assist =
staff with deconfliction if in need.<br /><br /></div>
<div style=3D"text-align: justify;">If armed clashes do erupt in residentia=
l areas where staff members reside, staff are recommended to stay indoors, =
avoid windows, and move to the core of the building to ensure, when possibl=
e, at least two layers of protection between themselves and the outside. By=
 doing so, the risk of stray bullets will be significantly reduced.</div>		=
						</div>
							</td>
						</tr>
												<tr>
							<td width=3D"23%" valign=3D"top" style=3D"font-weight: bold; width:2=
3.52%; border:none; font-size: 12.0pt; font-family: 'Arial', sans-serif; co=
lor:#15274B;  ">
								<div style=3D"margin: 12.5px 25px; padding: 0 12.5px 0 0;">ISSUED B=
Y</div>
							</td>
							<td width=3D"63%" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:63.58%; font-size: 1=
2.0pt; font-family: 'Arial', sans-serif; line-height:115%;  ">
								<div style=3D"margin: 12.5px 25px; padding: 0 0 12.5px 0; border-bo=
ttom:1px solid #C1C2C4;">
								<div style=3D"text-align: justify;">SA Mobile, Martin Hansen<br /><=
br /></div>
<div style=3D"text-align: justify;"><a href=3D"mailto:sa.mobile2@afg.ngosaf=
ety.org">sa.mobile2@afg.ngosafety.org</a></div>								</div>
							</td>
						</tr>
												<tr>
							<td width=3D"23%" valign=3D"top" style=3D"font-weight: bold; width:2=
3.52%; border:none; font-size: 12.0pt; font-family: 'Arial', sans-serif; co=
lor:#15274B;  ">
								<div style=3D"margin: 12.5px 25px; padding: 0 12.5px 0 0;">INSO SER=
IAL #</div>
							</td>
							<td width=3D"63%" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:63.58%; font-size: 1=
2.0pt; font-family: 'Arial', sans-serif; line-height:115%;  ">
								<div style=3D"margin: 12.5px 25px; padding: 0 0 12.5px 0; border-bo=
ttom:1px solid #C1C2C4;">
								AFGHANISTAN/COUNTRY/R/26092021/#001								</div>
							</td>
						</tr>
										=09
				</table>
			</td>
		</tr>
		<tr>
			<td style=3D"width: 100%; border:1px solid #C1C2C4; background-color:#53=
76b6; padding:0cm 0cm 0cm 0cm; height:63px; font-size:7.5pt; font-family:'A=
rial', sans-serif; color:white; text-align: center; vertical-align: middle;=
">
				INSO exists to provide dedicated security services to the NGO community=
. As a free service, INSO and its donors or partners, accept no liability w=
hatsoever for claims as may result from the provision or utilisation of the=
se free services. Whilst every effort is made to the verify data, INSO cann=
ot guarantee the accuracy of information provided. Reproduction of INSO inf=
ormation is prohibited.									<br>
<!-=
-</a>-->
							</td>
		</tr>
=09
</table></center><img src=3D"http://url2410.afg.ngosafety.org/wf/open?upn=
=3D1xPMNaAb5hQbWbtJAaodVRjep-2F2ikqxeVesJGNK9fSU3GS0QrdS39RakbhvnlzWBKlNqNV=
4lSihMxlE-2BH9J8-2BZQ6gxmSCk9vuEU8nqzzbVbh3BzYgdVys-2FDDtFw9Krs1IKUkPimJ-2F=
5wXuSVMet0UnoxNmzdnIuCu9hMOLIN9fTG-2BkM2-2F-2BrU2F2fOgOQfiJN169zvj3pIxQzhuf=
zfUtHjwn-2BarYNXe2gEoWXauSFl8LM-3D" alt=3D"" width=3D"1" height=3D"1" borde=
r=3D"0" style=3D"height:1px !important;width:1px !important;border-width:0 =
!important;margin-top:0 !important;margin-bottom:0 !important;margin-right:=
0 !important;margin-left:0 !important;padding-top:0 !important;padding-bott=
om:0 !important;padding-right:0 !important;padding-left:0 !important;"/></b=
ody></html>